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US. Department of Justice
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government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special
Counsel’s charging decisions.

Volume 11 addresses the President’s actions towards the FBI’s investigation into Russia’s
interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the
Special Counsel’s investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations
that guided that investigation.

U. S. Department of Justice

WNW—WWW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY T0 VOLUME I
RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference
operations identified by the investigationfla social media campaign designed to provoke and
amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg,
Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he

controlled. Pri_ozhin is widel reorted to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Harm to Ongoing Matter





In mid-2014, the IRA sent emlo eeS to the United States on an intellience-atherin_
mission with instructions Harm to Ongomg Matter



The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the US.
political system through what it termed “information warfare.” The campaign evolved from a
generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a
targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton.
The IRA’s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the
names of US. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United
States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as US. grassroots entities and persons and
made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The
investigation did not identify evidence that any US persons conspired or coordinated with the
IRA. Section II of this report details the Office’s investigation of the Russian social media
campaign.

RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS

At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in
early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions
(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
Army (GRU) carried out these operations.

In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign
volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
(DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU Stole hundreds of thousands
of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC
announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government’s role in hacking its network, the GRU
began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas “DCLeaks” and
“Guccifer 2.0.” The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks,



The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (“Trump Campaign” or “Campaign”)
showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage
candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, forecast to
senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate
Clinton. WikiLeaks’s first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump

announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server
of State he later said that he was s-eakin; sarcasticall

Harm to Ongoing Matter



WikiLeaks began releasing
Podesta’s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a US. media outlet released
video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section III of this Report details the Office’s
investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign
supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.

RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN

The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of
contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.
The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring
or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation
established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and
worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from
information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that
members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
election interference activities.

The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the
Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign
officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking
improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia
and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which
are summarized below in chronological order.

2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization
real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter
of Intent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization
executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian
government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through
at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.

Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact
with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to
Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told
Papadopoulos that the Russian government had “dirt” on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands


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